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SUMMARY
 
The financial history of the U. S. airline industry has been characterized
 
by continuous growth of revenue but irregular profitability. The recent past
 
has been a particularly difficult period. Concern over the future financial
 
viability of the industry leads one to question the causes of past difficulties.
 
For this reason, a study of the financial history of the U. S. scheduled
 
airline industry has been performed. The objectives of the study were to deter­
mine the causes of the erratic profit performance of the industry, to determine
 
the extent of economic improvement required in order for the airlines to
 
finance future equipment needs, and to evaluate potential economic gains from
 
technology advances of recent years.
 
This report presents the results of the study. The history of U. S.
 
scheduled airline profitability is documented, and operational and economic
 
factors affecting past and future profitability are discussed. The trends in
 
air traffic growth, capacity competition, and route structure are examined in
 
relation to load factor control and profitability. Factors affecting unit
 
operating cost and revenue yield are investigated in order to assess trends in
 
operating profit margin. The future capital requirements of the industry
 
are analyzed to determine required levels of profitability, and the effects
 
of load factor improvement, fare level changes, and technology advances
 
on future industry profitability are investigated.
 
No attempt was made to examine the profitability of individual carriers.
 
It is recognized that such considerations constitute important parts of the
 
overall airline profitability question. However, the study of individual
 
carrier profitability is of less importance to the objectives of this report
 
that is the industry-wide experience, and would have required a much deeper
 
investigation into the historic processes of the industry.
 
There was also no-attempt to make policy recommendations. However,
 
since an investigation of factors affecting the profitability of the airline
 
industry would be incomplete without some mention of the impact of regulation,
 
there are discussions of past Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) actions in a
 
historical context. It is not the intent of the author to convey either a
 
pro or con position on any past or future policy issue.
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It is important to note that, through route regulation and fare regulation
 
the CAB influences the profitability of both the industry and individual
 
carriers. Capacity limitation agreements and fare increases have an immediate
 
and strong impact on airline earnings. The effects of route award decisions
 
and load factor standards generally are not realized so quickly, but these
 
and other CAB actions can also have significant impact on industry profit­
ability.
 
The results of the study indicate that fare levels are not the source of
 
industry financial problems. Specific examples of operating costs in excess
 
of fare levels exist in certain short-haul markets and on routes with low traffic
 
density, and there are numerous highly competitive routes which have been
 
unprofitable due to fare discounting. Overall, however, the average revenue
 
yield has been adequate for a reasonable industry profit performance. The
 
profit erosion of recent years has been due primarily to excess capacity. A
 
permanent return to the load factors experienced in the mid-1960's would be
 
a major step in bringing a return to the prosperity enjoyed by the industry in
 
that period.
 
The problem of capacity control is an intrinsic characteristic of the
 
industry in the present regulatory environment. As it is a highly regulated
 
industry, the number of competitive modes available to the participants is
 
restricted. Since price competition is very limited, there is intense compe­
tition in the remaining competitive modes, such as the quality of service
 
and'frequency of flights offered. Furthermore, frequency competition is
 
encouraged by the belief of many airline managers that the airline offering
 
the greatest flight frequency receives a disproportionate share of the traffic
 
o a particulaf route. While this practice may be only one of many causes of
 
industry-wide overcapacity, it contributes to increases in the cost of
 
operation and reduces industry profitability.
 
The rapid increase in fuel prices of the past year has added a new
 
dimension to the airline economic situation. Average fuel costs in mid-1974
 
were about double these of mid-1973, and further increases will occur as
 
expiring fuel contracts are renegotiated at current prices. The annual fuel
 
bill of the U. S. scheduled airline industry is increased by about $100
 
million for each lQ/gal. increase in jet fuel price. Thus, future equipment
 
plans must give due attention to fuel conservation. Since fuel consumption
 
increases with aircraft gross weight, added emphasis will be placed on matching
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equipment size to the capacity requirements of each route. In addition, the
 
need for fuel-conservative aircraft will be an important factor in fleet
 
replacement decisions. There is a clear challenge to the aircraft manufacturing
 
industry to provide the necessary technology for significant reductions in air­
craft fuel consumption.
 
Near-term solutions to the airline financial problems depend upon the
 
course of action by the industry and the CAB, and upon the general economic
 
health of the nation as well. Through a combination of capacity reductions
 
and fare increases, industry profitability in 1974 was much better than that in
 
1973 despite substantial operating cost increases. However, traffic demand and
 
the cost of fuel and labor are largely beyond the control of airline management,
 
and present indications suggest that 1975 may yield both lower-traffic growth
 
and further escalation of operating costs.
 
For the longer term, the only acceptable alternative to continued fare
 
increases is a reduction in' unit operating costs. Historically, this has come 
through technological advances which have reduced fuel consumption and ­
increased the productivity of airline employees and of aircraft in service. 
The introduction of jet aircraft in the late 1950's provided large productivity 
gains as a result of substantial increases in both seat capacity and aircraft
 
speed. The new wide-body jets are larger, but only slightly faster than
 
early jets, and do not represent the same large step in technology that the
 
early jets provided over their predecessors. As a result, the reductions in
 
unit operating cost are due largely to'size, and the benefits have-not been
 
fully realized because of the inabilityof the airlines to fill the additional
 
seats.
 
The next generation of transports is expected to incorporate technologies
 
developed under Government sponsorship in the 1960's and 1970's. Propulsion
 
advances will reduce fuel consumption by about 20% to 30% from early turbofan
 
engines. These new engines will also provide less atmospheric pollution,
 
and may yield noise levels at least 10 epndb below current Federal Aviation
 
Administration requirements. Aerodynamic improvements may provide further
 
reductions of about 15% to 20% in fuel consumption, and commensurate operating
 
cost benefits.
 
Introduction of other new technologies such as composite materials for
 
airframe structural weight reduction, advanced engines, and new flight control
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concepts offer potentially significant reductions in fuel consumption and
 
operating cost. Such technologies are not likely to see airline application
 
before 1985, however, because the present lack of operational experience
 
increases the investment risk. Continued research into these and other
 
areas by NASA and the Department of Defense will provide the aviation
 
industry with necessary data on the performance, safety, and economic
 
aspects of these technologies. Long-term goals of the research efforts
 
include fuel consumption levels of one-half those of today's most efficient
 
transports. The operating cost reduction could exceed $2 biillon annually,
 
at the traffic rates and fuel prices likely to prevail by the late 1980's.
 
Since labor constitutes about 40% of airline operating expenses, technology
 
advances which improve employee productivity will have a large economic
 
impact. The output of available seat-miles per employee has doubled in the
 
last decade, saving about $5 billion annually at current labor rates. Further
 
gains are expected from automation of ground services, continued increases
 
in average seat capacity, and improvements in aircraft reliability and service
 
life.
 
-5-

INTRODUCTION
 
The air transport industry has long been one of the fastest growing
 
segments of the U. S. economy. Revenue passenger miles served annually
 
by the U. S. scheduled airlines have grown from 15 billion in 1952 to over
 
160 billion today. Although the air travel growth rate has declined as
 
the industry has matured, the Air Transport Association (ATA) has esti­
mated that the U. S. carriers will serve 300 billion revenue passenger
 
miles annually by 1980.(1) The air cargo market is expected to grow by
 
about 16% annually, reaching 20 billion ton miles per year by 1980.
 
Industries fortunate enough to experience such growth usually are
 
highly profitable. However, this has not been true of the U. S. airlines.
 
Despite tremendous growth in assets and revenue, profitability has been
 
very erratic. Whether expressed as profit margin on sales or as return on
 
total investment, the profit history of the airline industry has been disappoint­
ing to investors and lenders alike. The total net profit for the U. S. scheduled
 
airline industry has ranged from a high of $427 million in 1966 to a $200
 
million loss in 1970. Although the-industry has partially recovered from the
 
misfortunes of 1970, the net profit in 1973 was only $225 million, a relatively
 
poor 1.8% of total revenues. Although 1974 provided further improvements
 
in profitability, 1975 is less certain, due to traffic declines experienced
 
in the past several months.
 
The financial health of the air transport industry is a matter of public
 
concern. Numerous benefits accrue to the public from the air transportation
 
system. Air travel has provided rapid delivery of cargo and mail, and both
 
business and pleasure travelers have benefited by improvements in safety,
 
speed, comfort, and number of points served. Stimulated by a variety of
 
promotional fares, personal travel now approximates business travel and has
 
been the faster growing of the two markets in recent years. Further increases
 
in time and money allocated to leisure activities will make future air travel
 
increasingly attractive if the ratio of air fare to personal disposable
 
income remains favorable.*
 
The capital commitment required to finance the growth in air travel is
 
extraordinary. In the early 1960's the airlines launched a multi-billion
 
dollar re-equipment program which substantially improved air transportation
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productivity. Through conversion to all-jet fleets, dramatic improvements
 
in service and trip time were realized even while reducing the cost to the
 
traveler. During the 1970's another major re-equipment cycle is occurring,
 
leading to an even larger financial commitment by the airlines as wide-bodied
 
jets are purchased in increasing quantities. In the coming decades there
 
will be a requirement not only for environmentally acceptable aircraft to
 
replace the aging jets of today, but also for technologically advanced air­
craft to offset the inflationary impact of rising fuel costs and employee
 
compensation. Estimates of future airline capital requirements vary, but
 
the ATA has concluded that the U. S. scheduled airlines will expend about
 
$20 billion for new flight and ground equipment between 1975 and 1980.(2)
 
The required resources may not be available unless the airline industry pro­
fitability improves.
 
Concern over the future financial viability of the airlines leads one to
 
question the causes of past difficulties. Has the erratic performance of the
 
past been due primarily to natural fluctuations of the U. S. economic cycle?
 
Have allowable fare levels been adequate? What steps can be taken to ensure
 
that past problems are not repeated? In an attempt to answer some of these
 
questions, a study of the financial history of U. S. scheduled airlines has
 
been performed. The study was initiated in March, 1973, at the request of
 
Mr. William M. Magruder, then Special Consultant to the President. The
 
objectives of the study were:
 
(1) 	To identify the causes of the poor record of profitability
 
of the airline industry;
 
(2) 	To determine if the industry has been subsidizing the
 
traveling public, and if so, to compare prevailing air
 
fares to those required for a more reasonable level of
 
profitability;
 
(3) 	To evaluate the extent of economic improvement required
 
for the airlines to finance future equipment needs;
 
(4) 	To assess potential economic gains from recent technology
 
advances in the transport industry.
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This report presents the findings of the study. The history of U. S.
 
airline profitability is documented, and operational and economic faictors
 
affecting past and future profitability are discussed.- The effects of
 
traffic growth, capacity competition, and route structure on load factor
 
control and profitability are examined. Trends in unit operating cost,
 
employee productivity, and fare levels are investigated. Future capital
 
requirements and ability of the industry to finance projected aircraft
 
purchases are addressed briefly, and the effect of load factor improvement
 
and new technology upon industry profitability is analyzed.
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FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U. S. SCHEDULED AIRLINES
 
Industry Profitability
 
The U. S. airline industry has experienced tremendous growth since its
 
inception. The compound annual growth rate in revenue passenger miles (RPM)
 
was over 12% from 1946 to 1973. The number of passengers carried nearly
 
tripled during the decade of the 1960's alone. Even during most periods of
 
national economic recession air traffic has shown little or no decline,
 
although growth rates have been reduced. Total operating revenue has continued
 
to increase every year since scheduled service began.
 
Despite the continuous revenue growth, the profitability of the industry
 
has been erratic. Figure 1 illustrates the profit history of the U. S. scheduled
 
airline industry since 1950. While the decade of the 1950's represented a
 
fairly stable period with industry profits after taxes of about $50 million to
 
$80 million per year, this represented a declining performance in relation
 
to both the sales and investment required to produce that profit. Figure 2
 
shows that return on investment (ROI) declined from a high of 11.0% in
 
1951 to 6.2% in 1959; while profit margin on total revenue declined from
 
over 5% in 1951 to 2.7% in 1959. This profit deterioration occurred during
 
a period which saw total revenue increase from $1.l billion in 1951 to $2.7
 
billion in 1959.
 
By 1960 the industry profit was only $9 million, and a $38 million loss
 
was recorded in 1961. There then occured a period of increasing pro­
fitability during the mid-1960's as traffic grew by 15% or more per year and
 
the introduction of jets increased aircraft productivity. For the three­
year period 1965-1967 the average annual profit was more than $400 million,
 
which was greater than the total industry investment 20 years earlier.
 
Note, however, that while the net profit reached a peak of $427 million in
 
1966, the investment required to produce that profit had doubled from
 
$2.3 billion in 1960 to $4.6 billion in 1966.
 
During the late 1960's airline profitability was once again declining,
 
finally yielding a net loss of $200 million in 1970. This trend began in 1967
 
when most of the aircraft in airline service had been converted to jet and
 
the economics inherent in changing from piston to jet aircraft had largely
 
been realized. Rapid inflation in fuel and labor costs, landing fees, and
 
other expense items contributed to this profit decline.
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In 1969, 26 of 39 scheduled carriers had a net loss. Four of the
 
twelve major carriers had a net loss, and all nine local service carriers and
 
all three cargo carriers sustained losses. With a total investment of $8.6
 
billion and revenues of $8.8 billion, the total net profit of the scheduled
 
airlines was only $53 million.
 
In 1970 the record was even worse. three of the four largest carriers and
 
a total of seven of the twelve major carriers had losses. Seven of nine
 
regional carriers, and two of the three all-cargo carriers had losses. Of
 
the $200 million total industry loss, $118 million was absorbed by the
 
twelve major carriers. The local service carriers lost a total of $61 million,
 
despite federal subsidies of $59 million.
 
These periods of poor profitability have affected the ability of the air­
lines to purchase new equipment and the manner in which that equipment
 
is financed. Figure 3 illustrates the growth of long-term debt and stockholder
 
equity for the scheduled airlines. Prior to 1959 the majority of financing was
 
through equity capital. However, the re-equipment cycle leading to con­
version to jet fleets was financed primarily through debt expansion, and
 
by 1961 the debt:equity ratio was an undesirably high 2:1. This high
 
debt:equity ratio, coupled with poor earnings in 1961, made lenders re­
luctant to further expand airline debt in the early 1960's, and total investment
 
was nearly unchanged from 1961 until early in 1964. Rapid traffic growth
 
in the mid-1960's, coupled with the stable fleet investment, led to rising
 
load factors and greatly increased profitability between 1963 and 1966. The
 
increased profits allowed additional equity financing, and by year-end
 
1965 the debt:equity ratio was down to 1.17. This improvement in the
 
industry balance sheets, in addition to the rapidly rising traffic demand and
 
airline profitability, led the major lenders to once again expand debt financ­
ing of new equipment. By 1970 the debt:equity ratio was back to 1.97 as
 
long-term debt of the scheduled airlines reached $6.1 billion. The 1970
 
interest on that debt was $318 million, and, as figure 4 shows, interest
 
payments on debt have exceeded airline net profits in all but four years since
 
1960.
 
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1972 established a guideline of
 
12.0% ROI as being a reasonable level of profitability for the industry. Prior
 
to 1972 the ROI guideline was 10.5%. It is apparent from figure 2, however,
 
that the required level of profitability has seldom been reached. In fact, a
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10.5% ROT has been achieved in only five of the last 25 years, and 12% has
 
been reached but twice.(3)
 
Figure 5 shows the annual profit shortfall in terms of the additional
 
after-tax earnings needed to achieve a 10.5% rate of return for the certi­
ficated route air carriers. In recent years this shortfall has become immense,
 
reaching $730 million in 1970. Of course, as the investment base has grown
 
larger the absolute magnitude of a 1% ROI shortfall has grown. In 1970
 
a 1% shift in ROI was equivalent to $80 million in industry profit.
 
Prior to 1965 the investment base used in calculating the shortfall was
 
total investment, while after 1965 the CAB investment base computation uses
 
an adjusted investment, which excludes equipment purchase deposits. Thus,
 
if total investment were used as a base, the earnings shortfall since 1965
 
would have been greater than that shown.
 
Capital Availability
 
With large earnings shortfalls such as have recently occurred, it is
 
very difficult for the airlines to meet capital requirements for new equip­
ment purchases. Outside capital is difficult to obtain and carries a high
 
interest charge when it is available. Added debt-and high interest rates
 
further reduce future earnings and hamper efforts to reach the industry
 
ROI guideline.
 
A new period of financial stability, on the other hand, would have
 
many beneficial effects on the industry. Not only would internal sources
 
of capital be greatly improved, but lender confidencewould also be'restored.
 
For example, when the industry has a debt: equity ratio of 1.5, which is a
 
level acceptable to most major lenders, each $1.0 million of profit increase
 
generates a potential $1.5 million of new debt capacity, thereby providing
 
$2.5 million for future equipment needs.
 
Poor profitability also reduces funds available for new equipment by
 
reducing the investment tax credit (ITC) available to the industry. Although
 
ITC's are legislated only intermittently, they can be an important source of
 
internally generated funds. In order to realize the full tax credit, however,
 
airline profitability must be sufficiently high that federal income taxes
 
incurred by the industry are greater than the total of available ITC and other
 
tax deferrals.
 
In the late 1960's, a time of economic stress for the airlines, a new and
 
more complicated method of financing new equipment was introduced. As
 
an alternative to straight debt or equity financing, a large amount of external
 
capital was raised through investment tax credit leases. An outside party
 
would buy the aircraft, thereby gaining the benefit of the ITC, and lease
 
the aircraft to the airline. By the end of 1968 air carriers had financed
 
about $1 billion of equipment with ITC leases, and in 1969 about one-half
 
of the new aircraft acquisitions were obtained by lease.(
4
 
There are two disadvantages of the leasing concept. One is that the
 
long-term cost of financing tends to be high with leasing. The other is that
 
while lease obligations are sometimes regarded as a form of long-term debt,
 
thereby increasing the debt:equity ratio and increasing difficulty of securing
 
other financing, the leases are not recognized as a part of debt in computing
 
ROI. Thus, the maximum allowable profit in good years will be less than if
 
straight debt or equity financing were used in place of lease financing.
 
Implications for Future Profitability
 
The poor record of airline profitability described in this section is
 
a matter of public concern. In particular; recent deterioration in both
 
industry profits and financial condition raises the question of the ability of
 
the airlines to finance additional equipment needs for the next decade and
 
to maintain past levels of service. An objective examination of the causes
 
of this poor profit record is therefore warranted. Do the past problems stem
 
from inadequate fare levels, or has inability to control costs been the
 
cause? Can improved profitability be achieved within the current framework
 
of industry operating practice, requiring only a more stable national economic
 
environment? Will advances in aeronautical technology improve airline productivity
 
and reduce fuel consumption enough to offset future inflation in fuel, labor,
 
and other costs? Answers to these questions are sought in the following pages.
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FACTORS AFFECTING AIRLINE PROFITABILITY
 
External Factors
 
There are numerous factors affecting airline profitability, many of which
 
are not within control of the industry management. External factors such
 
as general economic conditions and actions by the regulatory bodies can
 
have major impact. Examples of external factors which depend largely upon
 
the state of the general economy include: the rate of traffic growth; escalation
 
of fuel costs, interest rates, and employee compensation; the method of financing
 
equipment purchases; and changes in employee productivity. Fare structure
 
and competitive route awards are major factors which are within the regulatory
 
powers of the CAB and over which the airlines exert limited influence. Aircraft
 
landing fees are determined by local authorities, and vary widely from airport to
 
airport. Only in the quantity of equipment purchased, frequency of flights
 
offered, and level of service provided do the airline managers have decisive
 
control over their own profitability. Of these three factors, the first must
 
be decided several years in advance of actual equipment needs because of
 
the long lead time in aircraft development and construction, and the other
 
two are often decided by competitors' actions. The absence of a significant
 
amount of price competition within the scheduled airline industry leads to
 
extensive competition in schedule frequency and quality of service, both of
 
which increase operating expenses. The extent to which these additional
 
expenditures are effective in increasing load factor and revenue, of course,
 
determines the success of the individual airline management in increasing
 
profitability.
 
Route Structure
 
Of the many factors affecting the relative profitability of individual air­
lines, route structure is of prime importance because it affects both
 
revenue and cost of service in numerous ways. The average stage length,
 
the traffic density, and the number of competitors are route-related factors
 
which can mean wide variations in individual carrier profitability regardless
 
of the general state of the industry. These factors can directly impact
 
profitability through load factor, average revenue yield, and unit operating
 
expense. They can also impact profits indirectly, by affecting management
 
flexibility to respond to the external factors discussed above.
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Average stage length can affect profitability because the margin
 
between revenue and operating expenses usually increases with trip distance.
 
This is partially due to the better ratio of revenue to fixed costs (ticket­
ing, passenger boarding, landing fees, etc.) on long trips. In addition,
 
the CAB policy on fare structure has in the past resulted in greater prof­
itability on longer stage lengths. This policy has been to allow cross­
subsidization of carrier losses on short-haul service by greater profits
 
on longer routes.(5) That is, the allowable fare on flight segments under
 
300 miles generally has not fully covered the cost of providing the service.
 
However, the allowable fare on longer stage lengths, where traffic is not
 
as sensitive to level of fares, was purposely made sufficiently high to yield
 
an adequate overall level of profitability to the airline industry. .This
 
policy could have considerable impact upon profit distribution within the
 
industry, since travelers going less than 300 miles account for 82% of all
 
local service airline passengers and 34% of all trunkline traffic.(5)
 
The CAB based this policy on the assumption that any fare structure
 
which increased the cost of short-haul service would drive these travelers
 
to alternative forms of transportation, adversely affecting the carriers and
 
being detrimental to public service. Losses suffered by local service carriers
 
due to air service provided in the interest of public convenience are at least
 
partially reimbursed through federal subsidy. However, trunk airlines must
 
offset these losses with profits on other routes.
 
Future changes in the fare'structure seem assured as a result of the new
 
rate policy announced by the CAB in March 1974. The new policy establishes
 
cost as a determining factor in setting rates, and will to some extent eliminate
 
the cross-subsidization concept. Future fare increases on short-haul routes
 
may therefore be greater than those on longer stage lengths. One expected result
 
of this policy is a shift of some revenues from the long-haul carriers to the
 
short-haul carriers, but the net revenue changes will depend upon the price
 
elasticities in both markets. The ultimate effect on profit distirbution
 
remains to be seen.
 
Traffic density and number of carriers serving a route are very important
 
to profitability since they determine the aircraft size required, the frequency
 
of flights, and the degree:of competition for market share. These factors affect
 
revenue through load factor and sometimes through competitive fare discounts.
 
-14-

Unit operating cost is affected both by service competition and flight frequency.
 
Employee productivity is also affected by traffic density. For example,
 
it is usually possible to obtain a better ratio of number of passengers to
 
number of employees on high density routes, since there is a minimum number of
 
flight and ground crew required regardless of the number of passengers.
 
Load factor is an important determinant of the ratio of revenue to
 
operating costs, and the carriers compete vigorously for a large share
 
of the total market in order to achieve high load factors on given routes.
 
Generally a carrier can achieve better profitability on a monopoly route,
 
since schedule frequency can be established with the objective being a­
satisfactory load factor rather than an attempt to increase market share.
 
Figure 6, reproduced from reference 4, illustrates that for one carrier,
 
35% of the profit in one year was gained on monopoly routes yielding only
 
9% of the total revenue. Another 50% of the total profit was achieved on routes
 
yielding only 20% of the total revenue, leaving 61% of the routes (in terms
 
of total company revenue) which provided little contribution to profits. This
 
situation, which is typical of the industry, leads to intense competition
 
for access to the more profitable markets, and often results in excessive
 
capacity being offered in the name of public service. For example, in 1969
 
the number of carriers serving the then-lucrative mainland-Hawaii market
 
was increased from three to seven. This circumstance changed that market
 
from a highly profitable one to one where large losses were sustained by
 
some, if not all, of the carriers. In the following year one carrier suffered
 
a revenue diversion of $73 million and sustained a profit reduction of $25
 
million due to market share reduction on its Hawaii routes.
(4 )
 
Operating Factors
 
Factors affecting the profitability of individual routes or individual air­
lines are of interest because they are signficant to the profitability of the
 
industry as a whole, because they explain much of the seemingly destructive
 
competition introduced by the airlines, and because they are an important
 
part of the background information which the CAB must consider in making
 
route awards. However, the guidelines used by the CAB in most regulatory
 
matters are not the profitability of an individual airline, but the profitability
 
of the airlines as a group. (5) It is on this basis that fare levels are set and
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route awards are made, and it is this broader issue of total industry pro­
fitability which is of interest to the present study.
 
Ignoring for the present the factors affecting non-operating profits,
 
such as interest on debt, income taxes, and investment tax credits, there
 
are four major factors which determine industry operating income. These
 
are total traffic and revenue yield, and total capacity and unit operating
 
cost. The first two determine total airline revenue, while the product of
 
the second two determines total operating expenses. The relationship of
 
these four factors and the causes of changing trends are explored in detail
 
below.
 
Traffic Growth
 
Traffic growth in the air transportation industry has been impressive.
 
From 1945 to 1972 the compound annual growth in revenue passenger miles
 
(RPM) was 14.6%. The growth rate has slowed somewhat as the industry has
 
matured, declining from an average of 21.8% per year in 1945-1950, and
 
14.3% per year in 1951-1960, to 13.0% per year in the i961-1970 period.
 
Future growth rates will probably continue to moderate.
 
Air passenger traffic has been somewhat recession-resistant,often
 
experiencing only reduced growth rates rather than contractions during
 
periods of national economic stress. However, figure 7 shows that the
 
industry has sometimes been quite cyclical. The two periods from 1949 to
 
1957 and from 1962 to 1968 both yielded average compound annual RPM growth
 
rates of over 16%, while the two periods from 1958 to 1961 and from 1969 to
 
1971 provided average growth rates of only about 6% per year. Indications of
 
traffic decline in late 1974 and early 1975 suggest that, as a maturing industry,
 
the airlines may be even more sensitive to the buinesscycle in the future.
 
Reduction in traffic growth has a severe effect on load factor, since
 
capacity growth is usually determined by new equipment orders placed several
 
years in advance. For example, from the time that the first airline orders
 
were placed for the Boeing 747 in mid-1966, until the first 747 entered
 
airline service in January i970, passenger load factor had dropped from
 
58% to 50%. The introduction of the 747, coupled with a very modest traffic
 
growth, had further reduced industry load factors to 48.5% by the end of
 
1971. The poor load factors of the early 1970's would appear even worse
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except that the wide-body jets have been operated at less than maximum seating
 
configurations due to the use of lounges-and generous seat spacing.
 
Much of the growth of air traffic has been due to pleasure travel. In
 
1972, 54% of the passengers of one major airline were pleasure travelers,
 
compared to 45% in 1960. If this relationship was typical of the entire
 
scheduled airline industry, then pleasure travelers grew in number from a
 
total of 28 million in 1960 to 103 million in 1972, while business travel grew
 
from 34 million passengers in 1960 to 88 million in 1972, only about two­
thirds as fast.
 
The trend toward an increasing percentage of pleasure travel has had
 
both a good and bad effect on airline profitability. While the increased
 
traffic has increased the total revenue and profit potential, the fare yield
 
is lower for pleasure travel, aid the traffic pattern is much more seasonal
 
than that of business travel. Wide variations occur n monthly load factors,
 
and hence in airline revenue, although the costs of providing air service
 
are largely determined by the number of employees and aircraft required to
 
satisfy peak travel demands. Airline economic efficiency would be improved
 
by a reduction in the hourly, daily, and monthly demand variations.
 
Although the matter of price elasticity has proved very elusive in past
 
studies of air travel demand, it is generally conceded that pleasure travel is
 
more sensitive to price than business travel. Thus, much of the growth in
 
pleasure travel may have been a result of the various promotional fares intro­
duced in the 1960's. While it is too early to discern the effect of the 1973
 
CAB order to phase out many promotional fares in 1974, it is likely that future
 
growth in pleasure travel will be reduced somewhat by this action.
 
Air cargo traffic has grown somewhat faster than passenger traffic, and
 
has recently accounted for about 24% of total ton-miles carried by U. S.
 
scheduled airlines. (1) The fraction of revenue coming from cargo traffic
 
has remained fairly constant at about 13% of total industry operating revenue
 
since before 1960. The growth of cargo traffic was subject to the same business
 
cycle conditions that'reduced passenger and traffic growth in the late 1960's.
 
From 1969 to 1971 the average annual growth rate was 7% compared to a rate of
 
21% between 1961 and 1968. This.slowdown would have been more severe without
 
tremendous growth in international operations of the all-cargo carriers
 
between 1969 and 1971.
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Traffic Forecasting
 
The effect on revenue and profits of changing passenger and cargo traffic
 
growth rate is enormous. The ATA has estimated that 1970 airline revenues
 
were about $1.25 billion less than they would have been if traffic growth had
 
continued at 1963-1968 levels.(6) A significant portion of this additional
 
revenue would have been translated into pre-tax profits since many of the
 
operating costs are fixed.
 
While the airlines have limited control over traffic growth, the extreme
 
sensitivity of profits to load factor suggests the need for good traffic fore­
casting and a flexible approach to capacity control. Traffic forecasting
 
methods can range from simple trend extrapolation to sophisticated econometric
 
models. Forecasting is an inexact science, however, and hindsight shows that
 
the airlines, the aircraft manufacturers, and the regulatory agencies all
 
failed to predict the traffic slowdown which so seriously affected industry
 
profits between 1969 and 1971. Moreover, the airlines were slow to adjust
 
capacity to provide a better balance with traffic growth rates. While a host
 
of reasons, competitive, legal, and financial, can be sited for this failure,
 
the fact remains that better load factor control must be achieved in the future.
 
Capacity Growth
 
The profitability factor over which airline management has most control
 
is available capacity. Unfortunately, the record shows that it has proven
 
very difficult to keep capacity growth in line with the rate of growth in
 
air traffic. It was noted earlier that the reduced traffic growth rates
 
between 1969 and 1971 had a very adverse effect on load factor. However,
 
load factor deterioration had actually begun in 1967, even while traffic
 
was growing faster than at any time since 1951. In 1967 the available seat­
miles (ASM) offered by the scheduled airlines increased by 26.9% over 1966,
 
while revenue passenger miles grew by 23.6%. Another 23.8% increase in
 
available seat-mile capacity was provided in 1968, and capacity increases
 
continued to outstrip traffic gains in every succeeding year until 1972.
 
Figure 8 compares annual growth rates in RPM and ASM from 1960 to 1973. Figure
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9 illustrates the declines in passenger load factor and overall ton-mile
 
load factor, and the trend in overall load factor required for breakeven
 
operation.
 
Causes of the poor load factor control are numerous: volatility of
 
market demand; the long lead time for new equipment purchases; the
 
necessity to add capacity in rather large increments; and the use of frequency
 
as a major competitive tool in seeking increased market share. The volatility
 
of traffic growth has already been discussed in some detail, and is, of
 
course, largely beyond the control of the industry. The second and third
 
factors are common to many industries, and can only partially explain the
 
erratic profit performance of the airlines. The competitive factor, however,
 
is a significant cause of-past instabilities in both load factor and profits.
 
The problems of long lead time and incremental capacity addition have
 
historically resulted in capacity growth which first leads and then lags
 
traffic growth. Rapid traffic growth, high utilization of flight equipment,
 
aid rapid advances in technology have contributed to a new re-equipment
 
cycle every 10 to 15 years. The new equipment must be ordered in fairly
 
large quantities before the aircraft manufacturer is reasonably secure in
 
proceeding with the very risky and expensive development program. Also,
 
the aircraft have traditionally been larger than the previous generation, in
 
order to accommodate future traffic growth and assure that the aircraft size
 
will be adequate for the majority of its depreciable lifetime. This usually
 
means that the aircraft are too large for the market when first delivered, as
 
has been the case with the wide-body jets. The combination of simultaneous
 
introduction of large numbers of new aircraft and increased size of individual
 
aircraft has made load factor control very difficult to achieve. This
 
problem is compounded by the difficulty in providing only a small capacity
 
increase to accommodate normal annual traffic growth on an individual
 
route. An airline must add capacity in complete plane-loads, which may
 
result in a much greater capacity addition than is justified by the traffic
 
growth.
 
Frequency Competition
 
The problem of matching capacity to traffic growth has contributed to
 
an inability to maintain a consistent margin between actual load factor and
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the load factor required for breakeven operation. Also important, however,
 
is the degree to which frequency competition is relied upon in the airline
 
industry. As members of a regulated industry with limited price competition,
 
the airlines have resorted to using increased flight frequencies to gain
 
increased market share. For example, the large capacity increases in 1967
 
and 1968 are probably more due to competitive factors than to any other
 
reason. Encouraged by the good growth in traffic and profits of the mid-1960's,
 
the airlines began a vigorous competitive battle for a larger share of the
 
growing market. Capacity was increased through investments in new flight equip­
ment of $5.2 billion in 1967, and an additional $6.5 billion in 1968. The
 
number of aircraft departures increased by 580,000 in 1967, an increase of 13%
 
over 1966, and another 400,000 new departures were added in 1968. The xesult
 
of these capacity increases was.that passenger load factors dropped from 56.6% in
 
1967 to 51.1% in 1969. Industry operating expenses grew by 36% from 1967 to 1969,
 
while operating revenues increased by only 28%. This two-year change reduced
 
industry operating profit by 45%, and industry net after tax profit decreased
 
by 87%.
 
Why does an airline management not reduce capacity by grounding air­
craft in times of low load factor? In answer, the Chairman of the Board of
 
one large U. S. airline has stated: "Adding frequency creates a great
 
competitive advantage, hence all competitors are induced to seek this
 
advantage. Unless an airline wants to go out of business, it must add capacity
 
to prevent other carriers from gaining the advantage over it. Thus, there
 
is no natural economic inducement to restrain capacity as traffic grows.
 
And when volume drops, a unilateral reduction in capacity can be economic
 
suicide. If you examine the performance of the trunk carriers over the past
 
five years, you will see that the carriers that increased capacity the greatest
 
had the highest earnings. The carriers that were the most restrained had
 
the lowest earnings."(7)
 
This view is widely held throughout the industry and is largely
 
responsible for the persistent downward pressure on industry load factor.
 
The view is based in part on the S-curve relationship between market share
 
and frequency share shown in figure 10.(8) This relationship has been
 
observed by a number of airline analysts, and is possibly a result of the
 
fact that travelers often contact the dominant carrier on a route first,
 
expecting to find greatest flight frequency and hence departure times closest
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to those desired. According to the S-curve theory, the carrier offering
 
fewest seats will achieve a disproportionately low share of the passengers
 
flown. For example, on a two-carrier route, a carrier offering 30% of
 
the t6tal available seats would typically capture about 20% of the market.
 
Since a passenger load factor of about 50% is required for breakeven oper­
ation, this carrier would lose money on that route unless the overall route
 
load factor is 75%, a figure seldom achieved. The alternative to operating
 
at an unprofitable load factor is for the minority carrier to attempt to
 
capture a greater market share by increasing flight frequency.
 
The S-curve theory is not universally accepted. It has been suggested
 
that the phenomenon may exist only in particular types of markets, such as
 
high density routes with pronounced traffic peaking characteristics. Other
 
factors, such as the limitations on price competition, may be more signi­
ficant causes of frequency competition and overcapacity. However, the
 
acceptance of the S-curve theory by some airlines seems enough to assure
 
competitive actions contributing to the problem of overcapacity and reduced
 
profitablity.
 
On an industry-wide level this type of competition can be very destructive.
 
When one carrier places an order for additional equipment, others may do
 
likewise because it is not known which routes will receive the new equip­
ment. Carriers thus sometimes buy new equipment more from a desire to
 
increase or maintain market share than from a requirement to meet traffic
 
demand. This results in equipment orders coming in clusters, particularly
 
if the equipment represents an advance in technology with wide market
 
appeal, as did the wide-body jets. While the near-term result is reduced
 
profitability due to overcapacity, the carriers hope that long-term pro­
fitability will be enhanced as traffic grows and market share is improved.
 
Fare Policy and Competition
 
Recent changes in CAB policy may reduce future capacity competition
 
within the industry. Concern over load factors led the CAB to establish load
 
factor standards for rate-setting purposes in April 1971, for the first time.
 
An interim standard of 52.5% was used in setting a 9% domestic fare increase
 
for 1971, but a 55% trunkline load factor and a 44.4% local service carrier
 
load factor were established as reasonable standards for future rate setting
 
purposes.(9) The local service carrier load factor standard was later vacated
 
by the CAB.
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Load factor standards are not intended to eliminate airline management
 
discretion to make needed capacity adjustments, but rather to prevent the
 
airlines from seeking fare increases to recover the cost of excess capacity.
 
This action may benefit both the public and the airlines in the long run, as it
 
will encourage better load factor control, which will reduce fuel consumption
 
and airport congestion, achieve a better balance between airline revenue and
 
operating costs, and reduce upward pressure on fare levels.
 
Capacity Limitation Agreements
 
Another CAB action which influences airline profits is the granting of
 
permission to the airlines for discussions leading to capacity limitation
 
agreements. Unlike load factor standards for rate setting, whose beneficial
 
effects will not be realized in the near term, capacity limitations have an
 
immediate effect on the profitability of the airlines involved by providing
 
substantial reductions in operating costs.
 
In the first such agreement, which began in October 1971, three carriers
 
realized average load factor increases from 38% to 54% on four transcontin­
ental routes in the first year of the agreement. This was sufficient to
 
change these routes from unprofitable to profitable operations. A two-year
 
extension of the agreement is expected to further inctease load factors to
 
60-65% year round, saving an additional $80 million in combined operating
 
costs. (l 0) In October, 1973, capacity limitation discussions were extended
 
to include about 30 scheduled and supplemental airlines serving the entire
 
domestic market. Although this action was in response to the jet fuel
 
shortage, it was also highly beneficial to load factors.
 
Capacity limitation agreements are an effective temporary means of
 
reducing present industry overcapacity problems created by equipment orders
 
placed before the current CAB load factor guidelines were established.
 
However, the entire issue is very complex, particularly in regard to
 
application on routes served by both large and small airlines. Widely
 
divergent views have been expressed by various carriers and government
 
agencies regarding the merits of such agreements, with some sentiments
 
expressed that the longer term interests of the airline industry and
 
the traveling public may be best served by free-market competition. The
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Initial Decision of the Administrative Law Judge in the Capacity Reduction
 
Agreements Case, CAB Docket 22908, to disapprove the agreements at issue
 
is currently pending before the Board on review.
 
Revenue Yield
 
While airline profits are influenced by route regulation, the effect of fare
 
regulation is also high. Although the CAB in the past has used route competition
 
primarily to reduce industry profits (as in mid-1960's) when ROI exceeds the
 
legal maximum, fare regulation has been used primarily to increase yield in
 
times of low profitability.(3,4) There have been exceptions to this policy,
 
including not only the recent capacity limitation agreements designed to
 
increase industry profitability, but also times when fare levels were reduced.
 
Generally, however, fare policy has favored increases which attempt to
 
bolster revenue in response to escalations in unit operating cost. The
 
impact is large because the effect of increased fare level is felt immediately
 
in operating profit.
 
Figure 11 shows that the average revenue yield per passenger-mile
 
realized by the U. S. airlines has fluctuated from year to year but in 1972
 
was at basically the same level as that of the early 1950's. This has
 
occurred despite the periodic fare increases authorized by the CAB. The
 
erosion of yield in relation to fare is partly due to a variety of special dis­
count fares used as promotional devices, and partly due to the continuing
 
increases in the percentage of passengers traveling economy class shown
 
in figure 12.
 
Promotional Fares
 
The concept of separate first class and coach service as opposed to
 
single class service was first introduced in 1948, as was the family plan
 
concdpt, where additional family members were allowed to travel at half
 
price with one full-fare passenger. Through the years military discounts,
 
youth standby fares, group travel plans, and various excursion fares have
 
been introduced in an attempt to increase load factors. These plans have
 
appealed primarily to the pleasure traveler, and have no doubt been a
 
factor in the rapid growth of that market.
 
Promotional fares have appeal to the airlines for several reasons.
 
They attract new travelers who otherwise may not have flown, and induce
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people to fly more frequently. They are also a useful competitive tool to
 
gain an increased market share for a particular airline. Thus, while some
 
revenue may be lost in the short term due to a diversion of passengers from
 
full fare to part fare, it is expected that many of the new passengers will
 
become frequent customers, thereby providing a long-term gain.
 
There is a strong possibility that the yield erosion which occurs
 
through promotional fares is fully offset by the increased revenue due to
 
load factor gains. The aircraft operating costs (fuel, flight crew expenses,
 
aircraft maintenance, and depreciation and insurance), which constitute
 
about one-half of total operating expenses, are fixed for a particular flight.
 
The remaining operating expenses, which include promotion and sales, traffic
 
service and landing fees, and passenger service, are only partly related
 
to load factor. It has been claimed that the marginal cost of adding an
 
extra passenger to a flight amounts to only 10% of the fare paid.by the pas­
senger, with the remaining 90% contributing directly to operating profit.(4)
 
Of course, this would be true only if the number of extra passengers were
 
not sufficient to require an equipment change to a larger and more expensive
 
airplane.
 
The strong relationship between load factor and profits does much to
 
explain the vigorous airline competition for market share. It also provides
 
strong incentive for the use of promotional discount fares such as family
 
plans, which encourage a business traveler to take the entire family on trips,
 
or group travel plans, which led to the present low-price charter concept.
 
Promotional fares have periodically been modified or eliminated in an
 
attempt to increase revenue. They have also been used selectively to
 
encourage international or domestic travel. Consequently the yield in a
 
given market has changed with time and in a different manner for different
 
markets. In 1959 the revenue passenger yield for international flights
 
was higher than the yield on domestic flights, both in first class and coach.
 
In 1961 this was still true, but a higher percentage df economy class
 
passengers in international travel had reduced the average yield below
 
that achieved in domestic travel. Changes continued throughout the 1960's
 
and by 1970 the domestic yield was higher than international yield in both
 
first class and coach. Excess capacity and a proliferation of discount fares to
 
meet competition from charter operations and government-subsidized foreign
 
airlines have led to this yield erosion.
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These factors have been especially significant in reducing profitabilty
 
in transatlantic operations. A decade ago, the profits from the North
 
Atlantic financed a worldwide network for European and U. S. carriers.
 
Now the situation is reversed. North Atlantic operations have become the
 
source of substantial losses for most shceduled carriers serving that market.
 
For example, one U. S. carrier lost $29.6 million on its North Atlantic
 
routes in 1970, and an additional $35.6 million in 1971.(7) The International
 
Air Transport Association has estimated that the scheduled airlines of the
 
world could lose $1 billion on the North Atlantic in the next five years
 
unless yield is improved.
 
An indication of how much yield improvement is needed to make North
 
Atlantic operation profitable is given by figure 13.(11) Although this data
 
includes foreign carrier operations, it is indicative of the competitive sit­
uation facing U. S. airlines on the Atlantic. Despite first class fare increases
 
totaling 15% over 7 years, and similar economy fare increases, promotional
 
fares reduced the average yield by 16% from 5.44Q/passenger-mile in 1965 to
 
4.55C/passenger-mile in 1972. *In this same time the average operating cost
 
increased from 5.68Q/passenger-mile to 5.92C/passenger-mile, leaving a 1.37(/
 
passenger-mile revenue shortfall.
 
Considerable attention has recently been given to this problem by U. S.
 
and foreign airlines, and by the CAB. New policy guidelines for transatlantic
 
charter rates have been considered by the CAB, and the scheduled airlines
 
flying the North Atlantic have agreed to a 10% fare increase, effective November
 
1, 1974. This was the fifth general fare increase for transatlantic flights in
 
1974, raising average fares 35% above the 1973 year-end levels.
 
Yield Trends
 
Figure 11 shows a steady yield erosion from 1962 to 1968. There have
 
recently been a series of fare increases starting with two in 1969.which
 
increased the average yield realized by the U. S. scheduled airlines from a
 
low of 5.46C/revenue passenger-mile in 1968 to 6.10€ in 1972. With further
 
increases to offset the rising cost of fuel, the average yield for the first six
 
months of 1974 was 7.06C/revenue passenger-mile.(12)
 
Airline yield may continue to improve in the near future. Figure 12 indicates
 
that the yield erosion due to diversion of traffic from first class to coach
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appears to have declined as coach traffic has stabilized at about 84%. Further
 
yield erosion due to promotional fares was temporarily halted by the termination
 
of youth and family fare discounts in June 1974, although new discount fares
 
are now being instituted in an attempt to ieverse the air traffic declines of
 
recent months. However, it does not appear that the number of passengers flying
 
on discount fares will approach the 43% estimated for 1971. (13) Finally,
 
increases in transatlantic fares will improve yield in this market. Since
 
international travel accounts for slightly more than 20% of total revenue
 
passenger miles flown by U. S. scheduled airlines, increased yield in this
 
market will improve total industry revenue and profitability.
 
Unit Operating Cost
 
One of the major factors in the airline industry's poor profit performance
 
in the last few years has been rapid increases in unit operating cost. For the
 
four-year period, 1967-1971, the industry experienced an average annual inflation
 
rate of 5% in operating cost per revenue ton-mile. This compares quite unfavorably
 
with the revenue yield increase of slightly less than 2% per year in the same
 
period. Although 1972 saw little change in unit operating cost, the uptrend
 
resumed in 1973 and accelerated in 1974.
 
The most important cause of the cost escalation prior to 1974 was air­
line wage increases, coupled with declining productivity increases. Airline
 
wage rates are among the highest in private industry, and have continued to
 
increase at a high rate. The average employment cost per employee rose
 
69% from 1967 to 1973.(14) Labor costs as a percentage of total operating
 
expense declined during the introduction of jets, falling from 46.2% in
 
1958 to 42.6% in 1963, but by 1970 the ratio was back to 45.6%.
 
Figure 14, reproduced from reference 15, shows that while employment
 
cost per employee was rising at a rapid rate in the late 1960's, annual
 
productivity increases dropped sharply. The result was a dramatic change
 
in the trend of labor cost per revenue ton-mile. The opposite was true in the
 
early 1960's, when annual employee productivity increases of about 10%
 
exceeded the 4% to 5% annual wage increases. This was a result of both the
 
rapid traffic growth in that period and the aircraft productivity increases
 
provided by the introduction of jet aircraft. By 1968, however, the jet con­
version was largely complete, and a declining traffic growth rate reduced the
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annual increase in revenue ton-miles per emplyee to 2% or 3%.(15) This, in
 
combination with the much more inflationary wage settlements which began in
 
1967, reversed the declining trend in employment cost per revenue ton-mile.
 
In view of the high percentage of total costs which are labor-related,
 
control of the unit labor cost is an essential condition of adequate profit­
ability for the industry. A return to better traffic growth rates would do
 
much to improve this picture, by increasing employee productivity.
 
Other elements of operating cost besides labor have also been increasing.
 
Fuel cost increases have until recently been largely offset by improved
 
fuel economy of current engines, so that the fuel cost per flight hour was
 
about the same in 1969 as in 1960. Recent fuel price increases have changed
 
this trend, however. New fuel contracts signed in late 1973 contained price
 
increases ranging from 25% to 100%, with open-ended price escalation clauses.(1 
6)
 
The industry fuel bill may have doubled in 1974, adding about $1.2 billion to
 
operating expenses. With a t6tal consumption of 10 billion gallons of jet
 
fuel per year, the U. S. airline industry will experience a $100 million
 
cost increase for every additional l/gallon increase in fuel price.
 
Airport facility costs and aircraft landing fees are also contributors to
 
the inflationary trend. Figure 16, from reference 17, compares the growth
 
in landing fees to the growth in the number of annual landings. The cost per
 
landing more than tripled between 1962 and 1971 although the average
 
aircraft size, measured by available seats per aircraft, increased by only
 
50% during this period. The ATA expects the cost of landing fees and airport
 
rentals to continue increasing by about 8% per year for the near future. (18)
 
- The unit cost due to depreciation of flight equipment has also increased 
since 1968. This is primarily due to a decline in the daily utilization of 
the aircraft, as figure 16 shows. The recent capacity limitation agreements 
will compound this effect because many aircraft will be grounded or flown 
fewer hours per day. Depreciation costs continue to accrue whether the 
aircraft is flying or not. 
Two factors are likely to reduce the contribution of depreciation charges
 
to unit'operating cost in the future. First, average utilization rates can be
 
expected to gradually improve as future traffic growth eliminates the over­
capacity problem which currently exists. Second, there is a current trend
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toward longer depreciation life for new equipment. The CAB has increased
 
the assigned useful life of the Boeing 747 from 14 to 16 years to match that
 
specified for the DC-10 and L-1011. One carrier has increased the depreciable
 
lifetime of its 727 aircraft from 13 to 17 years. The depreciation period for
 
other new aircraft may also be increased in the future.
 
Profit Margin
 
The effect of past changes in productivity on the operating profit
 
margin can be seen in figure 17. As jet introduction increased airline
 
productivity, the unit operating cost dropped from 30¢ per available ton­
mile in 1959 to a low of 19.5¢Q/ATM in 1968, Moreover, since traffic was
 
growing faster than capacity during this period, the operating cost per
 
revenue ton-mile dropped even more rapidly.
 
Although some of these economies were passed on to the airline customers
 
through a declining revenue yield, operating profit margins increased from
 
a low of 0.4¢ per revenue ton-mile in 1961 to a high of 6.8¢/RTM in 1965.
 
Then began a period of declining margins. The rapid escalation of expenses,
 
beginning in 1967, and reduced productivity, beginning in 1968, combined to
 
increase the operating cost per revenue ton-mile between 1967 and 1971.
 
Although revenue yield was improved by several fare increases starting in
 
1969, the industry operating profit margin had narrowed to 0.2¢/RTM by 1970,
 
and was only 2.4¢/RTM in 1973.
 
Close examination of figure 17 shows that the declining profit margin in
 
the late 1960's was due more to -the overcapacity problem than to inadequate
 
yields. While operating cost increased from 39.3€/RTM in 1967 to 46.5€/RTM
 
in 1971; the cost per available ton-mile remained nearly unchanged. Thus,
 
the introduction of stretched jets and early wide bodies continued to increase
 
potential aircraft productivity by an amount sufficient to offset inflationary
 
cost increases. The sharp divergence in trend between cost per RTM and
 
cost per ATM was simply a reflection of declining load factors and overcapacity.
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REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVED PROFITABILITY
 
Future Capital Requirements
 
The capital requirements for the U. S. scheduled air transportation
 
industry have been estimated by the ATA to be $4.4 billion for the period
 
1973 to 1975, and $20.4 billion for the period 1976 to 1980. (2) These estimates
 
are based on projected average annual growth rates of 16.2% in domestic and
 
international cargo and 9.3% in revenue passenger miles. Equipment require­
ments were computed using load factors of 57.5% and 50%, respectively, for
 
passenger and cargo traffic.
 
The traffic growth rates assumed by the ATA are less than average
 
growth rates experienced in the past, but are in reasonable agreement with
 
other recent estimates. (19,20,21) The ATA estimate of the capital require­
ments through 1980 includes the purchase of 661 new aircraft to provide a
 
net capacity increase of 62% from the 1972 level. A similar estimate of
 
potential capital requirements through 1980 has resulted from an analysis
 
by First National City Bank, a major finantier'of airline equipment pur­
chases. (1 9 ) This indicated a requirement for $25 billion for the purchase
 
of 680 aircraft and ground' equipment by the U. S. trunk carriers and
 
Pan American. Of this mount, $20 billion was assumed to be available from
 
internal sources, with the balance of $5 billion to be'raised by external
 
financing.
 
The actual capital requirements of the scheduled airlines will depend
 
on many interrelated factors. Considering the past difficulty of main­
taining high load factors in the face of stiff competition, the load factor
 
assumptions of the ATA may prove optimistic. More aircraft than are needed
 
may again be purchased. Moreover, the cost of aircraft modifications to
 
satisfy future environmental restrictions has not been included in the ATA
 
estimate. On the other hand, since both the CAB and the airline industry
 
recognize the economic consequences of the low load factors, there is sure
 
5' be a strong effort to improve future load factors. - Failure to keep load 
factors close to the 55% used by the CAB for rate-setting purposes will
 
penalize profits and increase the difficulty of obtaining needed capital.
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Even the lower (ATA) estimate of capital requirements will be very
 
difficult to achieve without substantial profit improvement for the industry.
 
Since airline debt positions are already very high in relation to equity.
 
significant expansion of the debt:equity ratio is unlikely. If it is assumed
 
that internal sources of cash are to comprise about 50% of the capital require­
ment, at least $10.2 billion will be required in the period 1976 to 1980.
 
Of this, about $7 billion may be raised by depreciation of equipment. This
 
leaves $3 billion, or an average of $600 million per year, to be generated
 
from profit after taxes and after dividends to stockholders.
 
Future Profit Analysis
 
Figure 18 indicates the operating profit margin required to achieve this
 
level of profitability in 1976. If 10% of the net profit is distributed to
 
stockholders as dividends, the $600 million capital generation requires an
 
after-tax profit of $666 million. This is equivalent to a 9% return to the
 
projected 1976 investment of $11.6 billion for the U. S. scheduled airlines,
 
and requires an operating profit margin (before taxes and interest) of
 
5.1/revenue ton-mile.
 
Also shown, for comparison, is the actual experience of the industry
 
during the past ten years. Note that a 5Q/RTM operating profit margin has
 
not been approached since 1967. A continuation of the 4% to 6%_R0I experi­
enced in recent years will leave the airlines far shoit of the profits need­
ed to finance future equipment purchases. In contrast, a net profit of about
 
$1.0 billion would result if the ROI guideline of 12% were achieved.
 
The profit analysis shown in figure 18 was based on a 48% income tax
 
rate, no investment tax credit, and 1972/1973 values of debt:equity ratio,
 
average interest rates, and investment cost per available ton-mile. While
 
future changes in these parameters would alter the net profit slightly, the
 
conclusions regarding profit margin requirements would remain unchanged.
 
Load Factor Improvement
 
What will be required of the airline industry and the CAB in order
 
to achieve the needed improvement in operating profit margin? Figure 19
 
provides a partial answer to this question. Here, operating profit margin
 
is shown as a function of overall ton-mile load factor, with the actual
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industry experience for the 12 months ended June 30, 1973, shown by the
 
asterisk. The curve represents the expected improvement in margin as load
 
factor is increased from the relatively low value of 46% experienced in the
 
1972/1973 period. This improvement rate assumes that 90% of the additional
 
revenue generated by increased load factor passes through to operating
 
profit, and that the revenue yield per additional ton-mile is equal to the
 
average revenue per ton-mile.
 
Actual profit margins and load factors experienced by the industry since
 
1963 are shown for comparison. These data appear to substantiate the
 
slope of the curve, and also to indicate that the primary cause of the recent
 
erosion in profit margin is the load factor decay brought about by excess
 
capacity. While revenue yield per ton-mile declined continuously through 1968
 
due to increased use of low-yield promotional fares and diversion of full-fare
 
passengers from first class to economy class, so too did productivity increases
 
provide a unit cost decline in each year prior to 1968. The first year to see
 
inflationary cost increases outstrip productivity increases since introduction
 
of jet aircraft was 1968, and this was followed in 1969 by the first of several
 
general fare increases.
 
It is clear from figure 19 that a major requirement for improving future
 
airline profitability is maintenance of load factors approaching-the levels of
 
the mid-1960's. To this end the airline managers must exercise caution in
 
equipment purchases and in application for new routes. At the same time,
 
however, it is important to ensure that as future load factors increase,
 
profit margins retrace the curve of figure 19. As wide-body jets become a
 
larger factor in fleet composition, and as traffic growth allows these air­
craft to be configured with higher seating densities than is now in practice,
 
further productivity gains are likely. This should offset at least part of the
 
expected inflation in fuel costs, salaries, and landing fees. However,
 
periodic fare increases may be necessary to compensate for unit cost increases
 
in excess of productivity gains.
 
Fare Level Requirements
 
Figure 20 illustrates the effect of a 4% increase in either fare level
 
or unit operating expense on the 1976 profit analysis. The solid line
 
reflects the impact of load factor on operating profit margin noted in figure
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20, based on the unit cost and revenue yield experienced by the industry
 
in 1972/73. The dashed lines show the sensitivity to a 2.0¢/RTM change in
 
profit margin. Ignoring potential price elasticity effects, the upper line
 
may be achieved either by a general fare increase 4% larger than operating
 
cost inflation, by reduced use of promotional fares, or by lower unit costs
 
accomplished through increased productivity. The lower line represents
 
the effect of inflationary operating cost increases uncompensated by fare
 
increases, or erosion of revenue yields through competitive discounting.
 
The impact of a change of this magnitude is striking; a 2.0¢/RTM
 
variation in operating margin would change 1976 ROI by about 3 counts, and
 
after-tax profit by nearly $400 million. Such changes are not without
 
precedent. Figure 19 shows that between 1965 and 1967 the operating margin
 
decreased by 2.34/RTM, although load factor remained nearly unchanged.'
 
Conversely, in 1964 the margin increased by 1.8¢/RTM, again with constant
 
load factor.
 
The previous analysis has shown that for the industry to achieve
 
reasonable levels of profitability in the years ahead, substantial load factor
 
improvement will be required. If the operating profit margin improvement
 
indicated in figure 19 can be achieved, a net profit of about $800 million
 
would result in the 1976 time period from a 50% overall load factor. Since
 
this load factor corresponds roughly to the 55% passenger load factor standard
 
designated by the CAB for future rate-setting purposes, it is the minimum
 
for which the airlines must strive. If, however, the load factor goal is
 
reached but the operating profit margin falls 1.5 to. 2.0¢/RTM short of the
 
projected improvement curve, as it did during the period from 1966 through
 
1970, the industry profit will be $300 to $400 million less.
 
With continued inflation of the cost of fuel, labor, and other expenses,
 
it will be difficult to prevent erosion of the operating profit margin without
 
further fare increases or productivity gains. Airline industry sources
 
estimate that the price of jet fuel will continue to increase as expiring fuel
 
contracts are renegotiated at current prices. A 25% increase in 1975 and
 
1976 would reduce the profit margin by about 2.5¢/RTM each year. A 6%.
 
annual escalation of landing fees and labor costs would reduce the profit
 
margin by another 1.5¢/RTM.
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TECHNOLOGY AND AIRLINE ECONOMICS
 
The economic dilemma of the airline industry has attracted the attention
 
of numerous public and private bodies. Many corrective measures have
 
been proposed or implemented, including fare increases, government sub­
sidies, route exchanges, mergers, and capacity limitation agreements.
 
Since most of the proposed measures are anti-competitive or result in either
 
higher cost to the traveler or a reduction in service, considerable opposition
 
is raised by consumer groups, government agencies, or competing airlines.
 
Some of these proposals are also short term in nature, addressing the immediate
 
concerns but failing to provide lasting solutions to the airline problems. While
 
the exact course of inflation is not predictable, continued long term increases
 
can be expected in the cost of fuel, labor, and other resources. The inevitable
 
result will be further upward pressure on the price of air travel unless
 
productivity gains and cost reduction methods are effected.
 
History has shown that such improvements are available primarily
 
through advances in technology. Figure 21 shows that each generation of,
 
transports has roughly doubled the productivity of its predecessor, through
 
ihcreases in size and speed., The Douglas DC-3, in 1935, made obsolete
 
every other commercial transport then operating because it pioneered a
 
number of new technologies. It had twopowerful, reliable engines and more
 
efficient propellors. It used retractable landing gear and other improvements
 
to lower the drag in flight and allow increased speed. It used new high­
strength aluminum alloys to improve the structural efficiency. Each of these
 
individual technologies represented a little breakthrough in aeronautical
 
progress, but the synergistic effect provided a major advance in aircraft
 
performance.
 
Similarly, jet transports, beginning with the Boeing 707 in 1958, revolu­
tionized air travel by providing substantial increases in size, speed, and
 
passenger appeal. Improvements in productivity, performance, and aircraft
 
reliability provided direct operating cost reductions of nearly 50% from the
 
m6st efficient propellor aircraft then in service. Reductions in travel cost
 
and trip time, increased safety, and improved passenger amenities and ride
 
comfort resulted in greatly increased air travel demand and the creation of
 
the airline industry as it exists today.
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The versatility, performance, and reliability of jet aircraft were made
 
possible by advances in aeronautical technology during the 1940's. Flight
 
safety and schedule reliability were aided by the development of instrument
 
landing systems in 1941, ground-based weather radar in 1948, and navigation
 
radar in 1949. The useful life and structural efficiency of airframes and
 
engines were improved by development of lightweight high-strength aluminum,
 
and by materials such as titanium, by introduction of improved fabrication
 
methods, and by techniques for extending the structural fatigue life. Aerodynamic
 
performance was increased by the development of the swept wing, in 1945,
 
resulting in reduced engine power requirements for high speed flight. The
 
breakthrough of greatest significance, however, was the turbojet engine,
 
which permitted a two-fold increase in aircraft speed. Developed in England
 
in 1941, turbojets were first used on U. S. military aircraft in 1944, and
 
were introduced into commercial use with the Boeing 707 in 1958.
 
The advances seen in civil aviation to date have been primarily a
 
result of government-sponsored research to develop military aircraft with
 
greater speed, altitude, range, and load-carrying capability, and with the
 
ability to fly in bad weather. It is typically 5 to 10 years from development
 
to commercial application of a concept, and often the reliability must be
 
proven in routine military use prior to incorporation in civil transport
 
designs. Reference 22 provides an excellent summary of the history of
 
aviation progress, including a documentation of the origin and timing of
 
the most important technology advances.
 
The economic impact of the new technologies can be seen in figure 22.
 
Although inflation of wages and materials have increased the cost of operating
 
each individual-aircraft, the introduction of larger, faster, more productive
 
aircraft reduces the effect bn the average operating cost of the airline fleet.
 
This benefit is the source of the reduction in unit operating cost noted in
 
figure 17, and is largely responsible for average domestic coach fare levels
 
in 1972 being only 2% more than in 1962.
 
Figure 23 lists the elements of airline operating costs, along with areas
 
of potential gain through technology. A major item is fuel, which now
 
represents about 20% of total operating expenses, up from 10% in 1973. Fuel
 
may be 25% to 30% of total operating costs by 1980. Means must be found to
 
significantly reduce fuel consumption, and research into alternate fuels must
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continue as insurance against eventual unavailability of petroleum. Labor is
 
still the largest factor in airline expenses, and opportunities for cost reductions
 
exist in both aircraft design and in increased automation of ground equipment.
 
The burdens of depreciation and insurance can be reduced through technologies
 
which increase aircraft service life and reduce the price of equipment. Indirect
 
costs such as landing fees and terminal rentals may become increasingly
 
important.due to current public emphasis on land use and ecology. Reductions
 
in aircraft noise and pollution are presently being legislated, and future land
 
use policy may increase the 6conomic attractiveness of aircraft concepts with
 
short field length or vertical takeoff and landing capability.
 
Fuel Utilization Efficiency
 
The cost of fuel to the U. S. scheduled airlines was $1.2 billion in 1973.
 
It will be about $2.4 billion for 1974 and may reach $4.0 billion before 1985.
 
The 1974 increase alone is'more than twice the combined net income of the
 
industry for the previous six years. Future reductions in fuel consumption
 
through aircraft design improvements will therefore have a major impact on
 
airline finances.
 
Figure 24 illustrates past and projected trends in fuel utilization efficiency
 
of turbine-powered aircraft. It is clear that there have been, and will con­
tinue to be significant gains in seat-mile productivity per gallon of fuel
 
consumed. These gains are the combined result of numerous minor and major
 
technology advances in aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, and avionics.
 
The number of available seat-miles per gallon of fuel consumed nearly
 
doubled from the earliest turbojet 707 and DC-8 aircraft to the stretched DC-B's
 
of the mid 1960's. Much of this improvement came from the introduction of
 
turbofan engines in 1960, which reduced fuel consumption of those aircraft
 
by about 22%. Further gains were obtained through aerodynamic improvements
 
and structural weight reductions, and design modifications for fuselage stretching
 
allowed increases in seating capacity of 30% to 35% for only 5% to 9% increases
 
in total fuel consumption.
 
Through further increases in seating capacity and utilization of efficient
 
high-bypass ratio turbofans, the wide-body jets have provided the capability
 
for further fuel economy. The potential gains have not been fully realized to
 
date, however, because low passenger demand has caused the aircraft to be
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'used with less than the intended number of seats. An average of 44 seat-miles/

(23)
 
gal. were provided by the 747 and DC-10 in 1973 service. This could have
 
been 51 and 53 seat-miles/gal., respectively, with the design configuration of
 
382 seats for the 747 and 277 seats for the DC-10. Additional gains are possible
 
through fuselage stetching. A 1978 version of the DC-10 could have 362
 
seats, which with minor improvements in aerodynamic design and engine per­
formance may reduce fuel burned per seat by 15% to 25%.(24) Similar improve­
ments are possible with the 747 or L-1011.
 
The pacing item in introduction of stretched aircraft is not technology,
 
but market growth. Versions of the 747 with up to 730 seats for long-distance
 
(25)
travel or 1000 seats for short ranges have been studied. Demand for
 
aircraft of this size, however, may not materialize for many years. In the
 
meantime, there is a strong need for performance improvements which
 
will reduce fuel consumption on aircraft of all sizes.
 
Figure 24 indicates that engines now in development could improve
 
fuel economy of current 707, DC-8, and the other early jets by 20% to 30%.
 
These engines offer higher thrust, lower operating costs, and lower noise
 
and pollution levels. The cost to re-engine the current airline fleet of first
 
generation jets would be about $4 billion, (26) however, and many of the early
 
jets do not have sufficient remaining airframe life to justify this investment.
 
An alternative would be introduction of derivative aircraft incorporating, not
 
only the new engines, but also aerodynamic advances such as the supercritical
 
wing developed by NASA in the late 1960's. Such aircraft could be available
 
in the early 1980's.
 
Transport aircraft of the future will provide significant fuel savings through
 
the use of technologies developed in the 1960's and 1970's. Near-term
 
technologies which may see application in a 1985 fuel-conservative aircraft
 
include the supercritical wing, composite structural materials, and advanced
 
flight controls. An increase of 35% in aircraft fuel efficiency may result from
 
these and other advances. Further gains by the end of the century are
 
expected to double the fuel productivity of todayts most efficient jets. (27)
 
The supercritical wing will provide aerodynamic performance improvements
 
of about 15% as well as lower wing weight. The addition of vertical winglets
 
on wing tips can reduce fuel consumption of both current and future aircraft
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by 5%. Other aerodynamic advances for far-term application include use
 
of such new concepts as porous wing and tail surfaces or compliant skins to
 
control turbulence and reduce skin friction. Considerable development
 
testing will be required to make these concepts operationally viable.
 
Composite materials are expected to reduce fuel consumption by 10% to
 
15%, as a result of structural weight savings. Advanced composite materials
 
programs of the Department of Defense and NASA have demonstrated weight
 
savings of 30% for major aircraft components, and manufacturing cost savings
 
are possible. Further research is needed on the mechanical properties of
 
these materials, and additional operational experience must be gained prior
 
to extensive application in a commercial transport.
 
Improved avionics, flight controls, and operational procedures may reduce
 
fuel consumption by 5% to 10%. By reducing stability requirements of future
 
transports with active controls it is possible to have shorter fuselages and
 
smaller tail surfaces, reducing both structural weight and aerodynamic losses.
 
Advances in propulsion will account for additional fuel savings. Improved
 
fan and compressor performance; higher by-pass ratios, more efficient com­
bustors, and higher turbine operating temperatures will combine to reduce
 
fuel consumption and improve engine thrust-to-weight ratios.
 
All of these technologies can combine synergistically to give benefits in
 
both fuel economy'and operatings costs which are greater than each individually.
 
Improvements in aerodynamic efficiency and structural weight result in smaller
 
engines. Since total fuel consumption is a function of engine size as well as
 
engine efficiency, this reduces mission fuel requirements. Reduced fuel volume
 
and engine size further reduce the size and weight of the airframe structure,
 
giving a cascading effect on the aircraft performance.
 
Acquisition Price
 
Depreciation'and'amortization, and insurance of flight equipment combine
 
to account for about 10% of all airline operating expenses. These costs, of
 
course, are a function of the acquisition price of the aircraft fleet, since they
 
represent provisions for possible future replacement.. There is, therefore, a
 
strong economic incentive in fleet planning to achieve the minimum cost per
 
seat which is coisistent with aircraft size and speed requirements.
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Figure 25,illustrates the unit cost of acquiring transport aircraft produc­
tivity, in 1972 dollars, with each of the principal transport models depicted.
 
Several trends are apparent. First, there is a definite economy-of-scale effect,
 
with the large, long range aircraft costing less per unit of productivity than
 
small aircraft. Second, the wide-body transports and other new aircraft cost
 
more for a given level of productivity than do the first-generation jets. Finally,
 
the Concorde costs more than twice as much as a subsonic jet of the same produc­
tivity.
 
The size-related benefits appear from figure 25 to be limited to levels
 
near those achieved with the current wide-body jets. Large new aircraft may
 
provide modest reductions in price per unit of productivity, but greater gains
 
are usually made with derivative aircraft based on stretching existing airframes.
 
The best example of this-is the DC-8-61, which provided nearly 50% greater
 
productivity for a price about 20% greater than that of the basic DC-8.
 
The increase in unit acquisition price noted for the widebodies is largely
 
the result of inflation.' In general, each new generation of aircraft is
 
developed and manufactured with inflated dollars, and will therefore cost
 
more than earlier aircraft. In addition, for highly complex aircraft such
 
as V/STOL or supersonic transports, significant technology advances are
 
required. The additional research effort further increases development costs
 
and unit acquisition price. This effect tends to offset some of the productivity
 
increases provided by new aircraft designs.
 
Technology advances which reduce aircraft acquisition price as well as
 
fuel consumption are highly beneficial to airline economic prospects. One
 
recent advance which appears particularly promising is the use of advanced
 
composite materials. These materials are making possible significant
 
r6ductions in aircraft weight, and as new fabrication methods and cheaper
 
materials are developed, small aircraft price reductions also appear likely.
 
Other technologies which reduce the size and weight of airframes and
 
engines may also have a beneficial effect on future aircraft prices, but only
 
if the design complexity does not greatly increase research and development
 
requirements. Possible examples are the aerodynamic and flight control
 
improvements discussed above.
 
-38-

Recent emphasis on ecological considerations will increase aircraft
 
acquisition prices, as future aircraft engines will be both heavier and
 
more expensive than would be the case without the need for reduced noise
 
and emission levels.
 
A trend toward reduced technology transfer from military to civil aviation
 
was established with the early jets, and this has adversely affected the price
 
of new commercial transports. Historically, significant amounts of the capital
 
and development costs of civil transports were provided through transfer of
 
both "know-how" and hardware. During the 1940's there was direct hardware
 
transfer, with only interior arrangements and equipment differing between
 
some military aircraft and the commercial derivatives. (22) Civil aircraft
 
development also benefited from use of Government-owned facilities, and from
 
production methods and design-team expertise gained on military programs.
 
With the introduction of 707 and DC-8 transports it was technology, more
 
than hardware, that was transferred. The advances in propulsion, structures,
 
and aerodynamic design that made the early jets so efficient were developed
 
on previous military programs. The 707 evolved from Boeing experience with
 
the B-47 and B-52 bomber programs, and had a high degree of hardware
 
commonality with the KC-135 tanker. The DC-8 had no military counterpart,
 
but like the 707, used design and manufacturing techniques as well as
 
engines derived from military aircraft.
 
The technology transfer was less for the wide bodies. Although both
 
the 747 and DC-10 use engines which are commercial derivative of engines
 
developed for the Air Force C-5A transport, the airframes for these aircraft
 
and also the L-1011 were largely unsupported by military developments.
 
Moreover, the tooling and manufacturing plants used to produce these aircraft
 
are privately owned. As a result, the investment required to develop and
 
manufacture the 747, DC-10, and L-1011 was in excess of $1 billion each.
 
To the extent that future design philosophies differ between civil and
 
military aircraft the technology transfer may remain limited. Military aircraft
 
are designed to specific mission requirements, and a degree of risk is acceptable
 
in applying new technologies. Performance needs often override cost con­
siderations. With civil transports, however, the primary considerations are
 
safety, economy, long service life, passenger comfort, and now ecology.
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The need to achieve low noise and low emission levels is a regulatory
 
requirement, and the goal of reduced fuel-consumption has become an economic
 
and social necessity.
 
The combined effects of inflation and reduced transfer of military tech­
nology and hardware is likely to increase the price of future civil transports.
 
The costs of noise abatement research are being borne primarily by civilian
 
Government agencies and by private industry. The introduction of supersonic
 
transportation has come first in the commercial sector, and the development of
 
fuel-conservative airplanes probably will also. While many of the technologies
 
required for both supersonic transports and fuel-conservative aircraft have
 
originated with military programs, the development and manufacture of integrated
 
transport designs will be civil ventures. Only in V/STOL aircraft for short­
haul transportation is there a strong likelihood of direct hardware transfer
 
from military programs to the commercial sector. This likelihood is based on
 
the similarity in aircraft performance requirements for civil and military VTOL
 
or STOL operations. Even in-this case, however, there are large differences
 
in the requirements for noise, economics, and ride quality between commercial
 
and military designs.
 
Employee Productivity
 
Figure 26 illustrates productivity trends for airline employees and for
 
three categories of labor: flight crew, mechanics, and administrative and
 
ground service personnel. There has been a long-term increase,in available
 
seat-mile capacity generation per employee, averaging 7.5% compounded annually
 
since 1960. This has been the result of increases in the size and speed of
 
aircraft in service, increases in aircraft reliability, and increased automation
 
of ground equipment.
 
The xapid increase in available seat-miles per airline mechanic is a result
 
of several factors: (1)better reliability and maintainability of new flight
 
equipment; (2) economies of scale; and (3) reduced frequency of overhaul
 
with increased aircraft service time. Of these, the last may be the most
 
important factor. The early years of an aircraft type are characterized by
 
maintenance problems, high defect rates, and premature system removals.
 
As operational experience is gained and modifications are made, reliability
 
improves and the time between overhaul increases. For example, the time
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between scheduled major airframe overhaul for DC-8 and 707 aircraft has
 
increased from 2500 flight hours in 1959 to about 18,000 hours now. The 747
 
was introduced with a 9000 hour maintenance interval, but is now up to 16,000
 
hours.
 
Technology advances are responsible for a paradox in airline maintenance
 
expenses: both increases and decreases in maintenance labor can be traced to
 
previous introduction of new technologies. Maintenance costs of new high
 
bypass ratio engines on the wide-body aircraft are higher than those of earlier
 
jet engines, causing some airline managers to recommend backing up to more
 
conservative technology levels. (28) Yet, the demands for noise and pollution
 
control as well as lower fuel consumption suggest that even higher bypass
 
ratios and higher technology levels will be preferred if not required in the
 
future. Avionics and electrical and hydraulic systems on new aircraft are more
 
complex because they have more functions. As a result, maintenance problems
 
with these components have increased despite the redundancy which has been
 
provided. Built-in-test equipment and integrated data systems have been
 
installed on board 747, DC-10, and L-1011 aircraft for the purpose of monitoring
 
system performance and reducing maintenance manhours. To date, however,
 
reliability problems with the monitoring systems themselves have proven dis­
appointing to some airlines.
 
Many of these maintenance problems are a result of the "introductory"
 
period in which the wide-body jets now operate. Based on experience with early
 
jet aircraft, engine maintenance-may be reduced by 50% as service life increases. (28)
 
In addition, increased use of new ground-based automatic test equipment for
 
engines and other system components promises to reduce future maintenance
 
manhours. One airline now processes 1200 subsystems and components with
 
automatic test equipment. (29) An inspection or test job that would require 12
 
hours of manual labor can be completed in I hour with this equipment.
 
The improvement in flight crew productivity has been less dramatic than
 
that of airline mechanics. The gains achieved in the last 10 years have been
 
primarily due to aircraft size increases which have improved the ratio of
 
available seats to the number of cockpit crew members. No significant improve­
ment has been obtained in cabin attendant productivity during this period. Since
 
passenger-to-stewardess ratios are fixed by safety regulations and passenger
 
service requirements, this situation is expected to cbntinue.
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Further increases in available seat-miles per cockpit crew member will be
 
realized as growth in traffic demand brings an increasing number of large
 
aircraft into service. However, reduced trip times, through use of supersonic
 
transports, would markedly improve productivity of both cockpit crew and
 
passenger attendants on long flights. Smaller gains would be achieved with
 
V/STOL transports in short-haul service, due to reduced terminal area delays.
 
Better air traffic control and aircraft avionics, along with fog dispersal methods
 
and automatic landing systems, will improve flight crew productivity by reducing
 
flight delays due to airport congestion and bad weather.
 
Advances in electronics could reduce the number of crew members needed to
 
fly an aircraft. Just as the requirement for a navigator on long flights has
 
been eliminated with inertial navigation e4uipment, so too could the flight
 
engineer be replaced by computer monitoring of electrical, hydraulic, and
 
power subsystems. It may be possible to eliminate the need for a copilot in
 
the future, through remotely-piloted vehicle technology. A ground-based pilot,
 
for emergency take over only, could be available for several flights simultaneous­
ly, with only a single airborne pilot for normal operations. While this procedure
 
would increase crew productivity, considerations of passenger acceptance
 
and safety may not permit implementation.
 
The productivity of administrative and ground service persbnnel has
 
doubled in the past 10 years. Much of this has been a result of traffic growth
 
and the use of more productive aircraft. Higher traffic flow provides a better
 
ratio of passengers to employees, and improves utilization of personnel. There
 
have also been gains through automation of functions such as reservations and
 
ticketing, baggage and cargo handling, flight control, spare parts inventory,
 
and customer billing. Airline acceptance of automation for all aspects of business
 
is now growing rapidly, although many applications are still experimental and
 
some have given problems. Future increases in the use of computers and auto­
matic equipment for traffic service as well as other activities seems certain.
 
Many airlines now employ computer-based passenger processing systems
 
incorporating automatic ticket and boarding-pass printers. With passenger
 
names and iteneraries as well as seat inventories now being maintained by
 
computer, reservation department productivity is up by as much as 80% over
 
(3 0 )
 the last 5 years. Airlines are looking beyond present systems for auto­
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matic printing and processing of tickets. Equipment is being considered with
 
objectives such as: (1) total elimination of the ticket coupon through credit
 
card readers which will issue only a boarding pass; (2) automatic self-ticketing
 
for passengers with reservations and an acceptable credit card. Experimental
 
installations of each type of system have been or will soon be tried. Widespread
 
use could be in effect in the near future. (3 1 )
 
Automation in baggage handling and freight control has been slow to
 
develop. New systems based on laser scanning devices or voice-activated
 
encoding systems have been developed for baggage sorting. Cargo containerization
 
has been helpful. However, many airlines reject the concept of a fully-automated
 
cargo warehouse or baggage system because of the lack of flexibility without
 
people in the loop.
 
The economic impact of airline automation is significant. One large airline,
 
which carries about 8% of all U. S. airline traffic, estimates that it saves
 
nearly $100 million annually with its computer system.(3 2 ) Although most
 
airlines do not yet have such extensive automation throughout their operations,
 
the potential for future gain is large. With labor representing about 40% of total
 
expenses, large productivity gains are needed to offset future wage increases.
 
By doubling overall employee productivity, as during the last 10 years, operating
 
cost would be much less than otherwise. The savings since 1963-amounts to 1.6Q
 
per seat-mile, or l0€ per available ton-mile, at today's labor rates. Similar
 
savings could be achieved in the next decade.
 
Terminal Area Operations
 
One airline expense which has been rapidly increasing in recent years
 
is that associated with the use of airports. Landing fees and terminal rentals
 
at most major airports are used to recover operating costs of the airport as
 
well as principal and interest on airport improvement bonds. These costs
 
amount to several hundred million dollars annually.
 
Other costs indirectly associated with the terminal area include the cost 
of reducing the environmental impact of aircraft operations. The need to 
improve the community acceptance of airports has led to a requirement for 
greatly reduced noise and pollution levels from new aircraft. While engines ­
now in development provide significant reductions in both emissions and noise, 
the cost to develop the technology results in much higher engine prices. 
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-Limitations on night operations at some airports result in a loss of revenue to
 
the airlines and under-utilization of equipment. Lawsuits in high-noise areas
 
around some airports constitute a potential major expense to the industry.
 
Airport congestion has periodically been a source of economic penalty,
 
and is estimated to have cost the industry about $158 million in crew, fuel,
 
and aircraft expenses in 1969.(33) While less of a problem recently, airport
 
congestion is expected to again become serious when future traffic exceeds the
 
-capacity of runways and air traffic control facilities. Expansion of present
 
airports is limited by-land availability, and construction of new airports is
 
expensive, and often meets public resistance as well.
 
Technology advances which provide reduced land use will lower landing
 
fees and airport rentals. This can be achieved through reduced runway
 
length requirements and closer spacing of runways. Close runway spacing
 
requires more accurate approach and landing control techniques and better
 
methods of dissipating wake turbulence. -Current NASA/FAA flight research
 
is developing advanced guidance systems and operational procedures, as
 
well as new means of reducing vortex generation by aircraft. These efforts
 
will also help reduce future airport congestion by increasing the maximum
 
number of hourly operations which can be allowed without compromising
 
safety.
 
Airport congestion can be partially alleviated by the development of aircraft
 
able to takeoff and land in all weather conditions, and by new techniques
 
in fog dispersal. Continued increasesin aircraft size will also assist by
 
increasing the number of passengers moved per aircraft operation. Perhaps
 
the greatest gains in land use reduction and congestion alleviation will come
 
from introduction of VTOL or STOL aircraft. Through substantial reductions
 
in runway length requirements, airports can be made smaller and multiple
 
runways can be constructed.
 
The use of V/STOL aircraft may also provide noise'relief in airport com­
munities. Despite the need for large engines to achieve short-field capability,
 
V/STOL aircraft tend to be quieter than conventional aircraft because they use
 
very little runway and have steep climb and landing approach angles. Thus,
 
the noise footprint can be contained within the airport boundaries to a greater
 
extent than with conventional aircraft.
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CONCLUSIONS
 
It has been noted that the U. S. scheduled airline industry has experi­
enced very erratic profitability despite a history of impressive revenue growth.
 
Factors affecting the profitability of this industry are numerous and inter­
related, and great care must be exercised to avoid oversimplification when
 
analyzing the sources of previous instabilities. In this study, an attempt
 
was made to objectively assess causes of past economic problems and prospects
 
for future improvement without making policy judgements or recommendations.
 
The results of the study indicate that fare levels are not the primary
 
source of industry financial problems. Specific examples of operating costs
 
in excess of fare levels exist in certain short-haul markets and on routes
 
with low traffic density, and there are highly competitive routes such as the
 
transatlantic which have been unprofitable due to fare discounting. Overall,
 
however, the average revenue yield has been adequate for a reasonable industry
 
profit performance, and fare increases have been commensurate with growth in
 
the cost of operation.
 
The profit erosion of the late 1960's and early 1970's was due primarily
 
to excess capacity. This was reflected in declining load factors and re­
duced operating profit margins. A permanent return to the load factors of the
 
mid-1960's should do much to bring a return to the prosperity enjoyed by the
 
industry in that period.
 
Poor load factor control is a chronic problem of the airline industry.
 
Direct competition often results from the existence of many routes with two
 
or more carriers. As it is a highly regulated industry, the number of
 
competitive modes available to the participants is restricted. Since price
 
competition is very limited, there is intense competition in the remaining
 
competitive modes, such as the quality of service and frequency of flights
 
offered. Frequency competition often leads to overcapacity, which increases
 
the cost of operation and reduces profitability.
 
Other factors also affect load factor control: volatility of traffic
 
demand; the need to purchase planes large enough to remain viable in the
 
market which may triple during the 12 to 16 years aircraft service life; the
 
provision of service in communities where traffic levels are low; the necessity
 
of adding capacity in complete plane-loads, when traffic growth on the route
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may justify smaller capacity additions. Each of these contributed to the load
 
factor declines of the late 1960's, and may continue to be a problem in the
 
future.
 
Airline expenses have escalated more in the last year than at any previous
 
time. Much of this has been due to fuel price inflation. Fuel now represents
 
about 20% of airline operating expenses, and increases are likely as expiring
 
fuel contracts are renegotiated at current prices. The average price of jet
 
fuel has increased from ll.5Q/gal in 1972 to nearly 25€/gal in 1974, and is
 
35c/gal or more on new contracts. Total industry expenses are increased
 
by about $100 million for each lc/gal fuel price increase.
 
Fuel consumption per available seat-mile is about 20% to 30% lower for
 
wide-body transports than for the early jets. This is a result of both increased
 
aircraft size and technology advances. Further improvements in aerodynamic
 
efficiency and engine performance will permit an additional 20% or so reduction
 
in fuel consumption with the next-generation transports. More advanced tech­
nologies now being researched may reduce fuel consumption by 50% from wide­
body levels by the end of thi century. Increased development effort by the
 
U. S. Government could accelerate this timetable.
 
Future traffic growth rates may remain lower than those of the 1960's,
 
as air transportation is a maturing industry. Even modest traffic growth,
 
along with the need to replace aging aircraft and to meet new environmental
 
standards, will create very large capital requirements for the airlines. To
 
provide the estimated $20 billion needed in the period 1976 to 1980 will require
 
considerable outside financing plus net profits of over $600 million per year.
 
This is equivalent to about a 9% return on investment, and will require an oper­
ating profit margin of 51/revenue ton-mile, approximately twice the levels of
 
1972/1973.
 
A 5c/RTM operating profit margin can be achieved with load factors equal
 
to the CAB guidelinesi but future fare increases may be required if produc­
tivity gains ate not sufficient to offset inflation in fuel, labor, and other
 
costs.
 
Increases in productivityiof airline labor have been a major factor'in
 
preventing more rapid fare increases in the past. The output of available
 
seat-miles per employee has doubled since 1963, and further increases will
 
result from present trends in the industry. Automation of reservations and
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ticketing as well as other ground services is progressing rapidly. Continued
 
increases in average aircraft size will provide a better ratio of available
 
seats to number of employees.
 
The future introduction of supersonic transports for long distance travel,
 
and V/STOL aircraft for short-haul service, would reduce trip times and improve
 
airline employee productivity. The V/STOL transport concepts also offer in­
creased passenger convenience, reduced land use, and lower airport community
 
noise. However, with presently available technology both supersonic and V/STOL
 
transports may adversely affect operating economics. Advances in aerodynamics
 
'and propulsion, as well as other technical disciplines, are required to improve
 
the economic feasibility of these concepts.
 
Inflation, emphasis on environmental improvement, and reduced transfer
 
of technology and hardware from military to civil aviation will combine to
 
increase the acquisition price of future transports. This puts new aircraft
 
at an economic disadvantage in competition with early jets developed and
 
manufactured at lower labor rates. The result is to delay the realization of
 
improvements in fuel-conservation, airport environment, and transportation
 
,service available with the new aircraft. This effect can be offset by increased
 
aeronautical development effort by the civilian agencies of the U. S. Government,
 
or by new economic incentives-or industry.
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